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A. States are Immune from Federal Patent-Infringement Suits in Federal
Court
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the
Eleventh Amendment, states are immune from patent
infringement suits in federal court.1 The decision is the result of
recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence effectively granting
states complete sovereign immunity from private suits, based on
2federal rights, in both state and federal courts. An examination of
College Savings Bank reveals that this jurisprudence renders
businesses powerless to protect patents against state infringement.
College Savings Bank (College Savings), located in Princeton
New Jersey, patented a financing method in which certificates of
deposits were sold to finance college tuition. s The investment,
structured like an annuity, and known as "CollegeSure CD," was
designed to ensure sufficient funding for parents to meet futureS 4
college tuition costs for their children. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expenses Board (Florida Prepaid),
created as an entity of the State of Florida, began selling similarS.5
prepaid college investment annuities. College Savings sued
Florida Prepaid, alleging that Florida's investment contract
6infrirged upon College Saving's patent.
At trial, College Savings alleged that Florida Prepaid had
violated the Patent Remedy Act' by willfully infringing upon its
1. 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (holding that "states
retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation"); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate
eleventh amendment state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers by
subjecting states to lawsuits in federal courts).




7. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The relevant portion of the
1
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patent." Florida Prepaid argued that based upon a recent Supreme
Court decision, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, states could not be sued
without their consent and therefore the suit should be dismissed. 9
The crux of Florida Prepaid's argument was that Congress' use of
its Article 10 powers to abrogate sovereign immunity was
unconstitutional. The district court disagreed with this argument
and denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss. 12 The Federal
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Congress clearly intended
to abrogate states' immunity, and that the power to abrogate was
granted by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
statute provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this tide, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted
for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall
be liable as a contributory infringer.
Id.
8. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2203.
9. See id. at 2204.
10. The Patent Clause of Article I provides that "Congress shall have
Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Commerce Clause
provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2204.
12. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 401 (D. N.J. 1996), affd, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
rev'd, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
13. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 1998), revd, Florida Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). The Fourteenth
Amendment, in part reads, "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. ... The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
1208 [Vol. 26:4
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting the Eleventh
Amendment which provides that, "[t]he Judicial Power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." 4 The Court went on to note that although taken
literally, the text of the Eleventh Amendment restricts only the
Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 5  The
Eleventh Amendment has, for over one hundred years, not been
taken for its literal meaning, but instead for what it was understood
to mean when ratified, that "each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system; [and that] it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent."16 The Court thus framed the issue as "whether Congress
has 'unequivocally expresse [d] its intent to abrogate the
immunity,' [and] whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.'
In resolving the issues, the Court agreed that Congress had
unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate sovereign
immunity when it added to the Patent Remedy Act "[a] ny State...
shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of
sovereign immunity, from suit in federal court.. . for infringement
of a patent." 8  Although the Court noted that Congress clearly
intended to abrogate states' sovereign immunity, whether Congress
had the power to do so, was entirely another matter.19
The Court noted that "Congress justified the Patent Remedy
Act under three sources of constitutional authority: the Patent
Clause ... the Interstate Commerce Clause... and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. " '° The Court quickly noted that based on
its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, "Congress may not
14. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2204 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
15. See id.
16. Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1890) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), "For over a century we have reaffirmed
that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States 'was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States.'")).
17. Id. at 2205 (citations omitted).
18. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994)).
19. See id.
20. Id.; see also supra note 10 (quoting the Patent Clause and Interstate
Commerce Clause) and note 13 (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment).
20001 1209
3
Dohrwardt: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Business Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers."' As for abrogating states' sovereign immunity powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court noted that section
five of the amendment allowed Congress to abrogate for
appropriate legislation.22  But the court added, in order for
legislation to be appropriate, and thus allow "Congress to invoke §
5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct. '"2
Here, the Court held that, "in enacting the Patent Remedy
Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of patent
infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional
violations. "24 The Court reasoned that although the infringement
of a patent interfered with the owner's right to exclude others, it
25did not amount to a constitutional deprivation of property.
Because the court concluded that the Congressional record does
not support the notion that occasional infringement by states did
not rise to the level of systematic deprivation of property, the
legislation was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.
26
Essentially, what Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank reveals is that so long as states only
occasionally infringe upon patents where state remedies are not
available, businesses are powerless in protecting their property.
Indeed, so long as systematic infringement never occurs, Congress
too, is powerless to provide a remedy for the taking of a federally
granted property right.
B. Baseball's Anti-Trust Exemption: Still Valid?
In Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State, the Minnesota Supreme
Court examined the business of baseball and its unique exemption
from antitrust suits. 27 This action presented an opportunity to
21. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2205.
22. See id. at 2205-06.
23. See id. at 2207.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 2208.
26. Id. at 2210 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
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clarify baseball's exemption from antitrust legislation, specifically
whether the Twin's proposed sale and relocation of the team to
another state fell within the exemption."
The ruling came after Minnesota's Attorney General served
the Twins with civil investigative demands (CIDs) designed to
gather information to be used in the state's investigation of
possible state antitrust laws violation. The Twins responded by
filing a motion for a protective order in district court.3 ° The district
court denied the motion and granted the state's motion to compel
compliance with the CIDs. The court of appeals denied review of
the district court's order, holding that the case presented
premature issues and that the Twins were free to assert the antitrust
exemption as an affirmative defense should prosecution occur.2
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district
court and held that the proposed sale and relocation of the team
were exempt from federal and state antitrust laws.33 Therefore,
enforcement of the investigative demands was outside the Attorney
General's authority because no enforcement action could follow
the investigation.
3
In October 1997, the Minnesota Twins announced that it had
reached a deal to sell the team to a North Carolina group.35 The
deal was made contingent upon the Minnesota Legislature's refusal
to provide public funding of a new stadium. All stadium-
financing bills were refused by the legislature.37 In December 1997,
the Minnesota Attorney General served the Twins with civil
investigation demands.3' The demand requested a broad array of
documents "concerning... the financial viability of the
Metrodome,... the methods used by other professional baseball
28. See id.
29. See id. at 849.
30. See id. at 850. A motion for a protective order is made under MINN. R.
Civ. P. 26.03.
31. See Minnesota Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 850.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 856.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 849.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. "[T]he attorney General's Office has the authority to demand
discovery from persons suspected of violating state laws governing trade and
commerce. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 2 (1998). This discovery is demanded
through documents called civil investigative demands which issue directly from the
Attorney General's Office." Id. at 849 n.2.
2000]
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teams to obtain a new stadium, and the potential purchase of the
Twins.",39 The demand also requested information dating back to
the Twins relocation from Washington in 1961, as well as
information related to the governance, structure and revenues of
Major League Baseball.a°
The Twins argued that the investigation was precluded by
professional baseball's exemption from antitrust laws; that the
investigation was precluded by the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution; and that the CIDs were overly broad and that
compliance would be burdensome. 4' The state argued that its
concern regarding a possible Twin's boycott of Minnesota justified
the state's investigation, saying, "it is reasonable to infer that the
owners of MLB [Major League Baseball] teams are acting in
concert to affect an illegal boycott and/or a price fixing
agreement. Furthermore, the state argued that MLB was
"unlawfully exercising joint monopoly power. 43 The court framed
the issue as an inquiry into the precise scope of professional
baseball's exemption from antitrust laws.4
The court began its analysis by noting that Minnesota's
antitrust laws are interpreted with federal court's construction of
federal antitrust laws.45 Under federal construction, both federal
46and state laws are broadly construed. The court noted that "[t] his
means that 'exemptions from the antitrust laws must be construed
narrowly.' 4 4 The court noted that since Federal Baseball Club o8
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Inc.,
baseball has been exempt from federal antitrust laws.49 In Federal
Baseball, a suit was brought after the National League bought out
seven of the eight teams of the Federal League, leaving Baltimore,
39. Id. at 849-50.
40. See id. at 850.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 851.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. (citing State of Minn. v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 888,
894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).
46. See id. at 851-52 (citing Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V.
Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 305 (Minn. 1980)).
47. Id. at 852 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126
(1982)).
48. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
49. See Minnesota Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 852.
1212 [Vol. 26:4
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the eighth team, without any competitors. The Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to baseball
because baseball was not interstate commerce."'
Another baseball case came to the Supreme Court thirty years
later in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. In Toolson, a pitcher
argued that baseball's reserve system violated antitrust law. The
Court, per curiam, noted that Congress had declined to legislatively
overrule professional baseball's exemption since its ruling in Federal
Baseball and that any change should come from Congress.
The next major case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court
was also, according to the Minnesota Twins Partnership Court, the
most thorough look at baseball's exemption from antitrust. In
Flood v. Kuhn16 another case involving a challenge to baseball's
reserve system, player Curt Flood sued after unwillingly being
traded to a new team.57 The district court had held that baseball's
antitrust exemption applied and the court of apsIeals affirmed.
58
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Court's
opinion was consistent with the district court's holding:
[T]he exemption set forth in Federal Baseball is limited
strictly to professional baseball, and despite frequent
invitations to review the issue, Congress has allowed the
anomalous exemption to remain.... The court
acknowledged that the legal footings for the exemption
were no longer valid, stating that "[p] rofessional baseball
is business and it is engaged in interstate commerce," but
held that baseball remained exempt from federal antitrust
50. See Federal Baseball Club, 259 U.S. at 207.
51. See id. at 208-09 ("The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are
purely state affairs.... The transport [of teams] is a mere incident, not the
essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for
money would not be called trade of commerce in the commonly accepted use of
those words."). The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the reasoning in Federal
Baseball Club would seem to apply to nearly all live performances. See Minnesota
Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 852. The United States Supreme Court has
declined to extend such an exemption. See id.
52. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
53. See id. at 362-63. The reserve system is predicated on a reserve clause in a
player's contract that gives the team exclusive rights to a player. See id. at 364 n.10.
54. See id. at 357.
55. See Minnesota Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 853.
56. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
57. See id. at 264-65.
58. See id. at 266-67.
59. See id. at 285.
2000] 1213
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law under the stare decisis of Federal Baseball and Toolson.6 °
The Minnesota Supreme Court opinion concluded by quoting
Toolson1 stating that "the business of baseball" is exempt from
antitrust legislation based on stare decisis and congressional
inaction. 2
Under federal construction, the Twins court concluded, "'the
great weight of federal cases' hold that Flood exempts the entire
business of baseball from federal and state antitrust claims. 63 The
court went on to say that it would follow the lead of these cases and
"conclude the business of professional baseball is exempt from
federal antitrust laws. "64 The court then stated that the sale and
relocation of the Twins was an integral part of the business of
baseball and falls within the exemption.65
The problem that emerges in baseball antitrust jurisprudence
is clear. The United States Supreme Court granted exemption to
baseball in a time when "gilded age" judges-judges who disagreed
with federal intervention of business-sat on the court. From this
judicially declared exemption, Congress has continually refused to
override it. As a result, lower courts are forced to rely on stare
decisis and congressional inaction, and thus uphold an exemption
that is denied to all other professional sports or any other business
entity.
C. Must a Lack of Marketability Discount be Applied when the Court
Orders a Minority-Shareholder Buyout?
In Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals examined whether in a closed-corporation
buyout, if the oppressive shareholder may apply a lack of
marketability discount to a minority shareholder's purchase price.
66
The court held, as a matter of first impression, that "a marketability
discount cannot be used unfairly by controlling or oppressing
shareholders to benefit themselves to the detriment of the minority
60. See Minnesota Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 854.
61. SeeToolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
62. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 285.
63. Minnesota Twins Partnership, 592 N.W.2d at 854.
64. Id. at 856.
65. See id.









Marco Scibora formed Advanced Communication Design
(ACD) in 1986. 8 Mr. Scibora was the company's sole shareholder
until 1990 when two others, including Brian Follett, each became
one-third owners in ACD by each purchasing 1500 shares of
nonvoting stock.69 The two investors also signed an agreement
giving ACD the right of first refusal to purchase any departing
stockholder's shares. 0 In 1996, Fran Scibora, Marco Scibora's wife,
became ACD's chief operating officer." Her compensation was to
include 1500 shares of nonvoting stock, which would be converted
to common stock provided she remained employed with ACD for
72
one year.
Eight months after Mrs. Scibora became chief operating
officer, she demoted Brian Follett, who was the only remaining
shareholder besides her husband, from vice-president to manager.
Mr. Follett's compensation was also substantially reduced.74 Mr.
Follett subsequently resigned from ACD and sued after Mr. Scibora
offered $24,646 for his 1500 shares.7" Mr. Follett alleged bad faith
and a breach of fiduciary duty, and after a bench trial, the court
ordered the Sciboras to buy back Mr. Follett's stock for $475,381.76
The Sciboras appealed, arguing that as a matter of law, the court
must apply a lack of marketability discount in a forced buyout of a
minority shareholder.77
The court began its analysis by noting that "[t]here is no
Minnesota law on the application of a lack of marketability
discount." 8 The court then examined two recent NewJersey cases
addressing the issue.79 In Balsamides v. Protameen Chemicals, Inc., the
district court ordered a forced oppressor shareholder buyout by an
67. Id. at 711.















Dohrwardt: A Survey of Recent Developments in the Law: Business Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
oppressed shareholder.0 The district court also ordered that a
thirty-five percent lack of marketability discount be applied to the
sale. NewJersey's appellate court reversed, holding that a lack of
marketability discount was inappropriate when the transaction
resulted in the buyer obtaining total ownership of the
corporation. ' New Jersey's Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's holding, stating "we find that courts in deciding whether to
apply a marketability discount to determine the 'fair value' of
shares of a shareholder forced to sell his stock in a judicially
ordered buy-out must take into account what is fair and
equitable.
83
The Balsamides court explained that allowing an oppressor
shareholder, in a court ordered buyout, to receive a non-
discounted value, would reward the oppressor shareholder for its
oppressive actions.8 4 The court imposed a lack of marketability
discount, stating, "to do otherwise would be unfair. '8 5 In discussing
the Balsamides case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned that
the Balsamides court addressed an oppressed shareholder buying
out an oppressive shareholder. The court noted that Balsamides
was distinguishable from the issue before them, because the
decision stated, "[w] hat to do when it is the oppressing shareholder
who is given the buy-out option is a harder question that we need
not decide."
8
The court then looked at a second case deciding the same
issue, Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith," which involved a
group of shareholders who owned fifteen percent of a
corporation's stock and declined to approve a restructuring plan.s9
The trial court found that a marketability discount should be
applied because the dissenting shareholders had caused
"extraordinary circumstances" that may have prevented an initial
80. 734 A.2d 721, 724-25, 732 (N.J. 1999).
81. See id. at 725.
82. See id. at 726.
83. Id. at 735.
84. See id. at 736 ("[T]he equities of the case quite clearly lie with [the
oppressed shareholder], it would be unfair to allow [the oppressor shareholder]
to receive [the corporation's] undiscounted value.").
85. Id. at 736.
86. See Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 601 N.W.2d 707, 710
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, (Minn.Jan. 18, 2000).
87. Id. at 710 (quoting Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 738).
88. 734 A.2d 738 (N.J. 1999).
89. See id. at 741-42.
1216 [Vol. 26:4
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public offering.90 The appellate court affirmed.91 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
The very nature or the term "fair value" suggests that
courts must take fairness and equity into account in
deciding whether to apply a discount to the value of the
dissenting shareholder's stock.... Marketability
discounts should not be applied when determining the
"fair value" of dissenting shareholders' stock in an
appraisal action. The dissenters in this case wanted
liquidity for their stock and wanted to sell their stock in a
corporation now controlled by new management in whom
they lacked confidence. That is not an "extraordinary
circumstance."92
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reasoned that the New Jersey
Supreme Court reconciled decisions to erect a "guiding principle-
a marketability discount cannot be used unfairly by controlling or
oppressing shareholders to benefit themselves to the detriment of
the minority or oppressed shareholders.""' Under current
Minnesota law, if a majority shareholder oppresses a minority
shareholder, equity demands a marketability discount not be
applied to a valuation of stock in a forced buyout.
94
D. Court Reaffirms Restricted Review of Special Litigation Committees
In Driling v. Berman,5 the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected
an opportunity to expand current Minnesota law to scrutinize a
special litigation committee's recommendation "by inquiring into
the reasonableness of the committee's decision in addition to the
,,96committee's independence and good faith. The action, a
derivative suit brought on behalf of Grand Casinos, alleged that
members of Grand Casino's executive staff "breached their
fiduciary duty and misused corporate assets by: (1) using Grand's
90. See id. at 744.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 748, 750.
93. Advanced Communication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 601 N.W.2d 707, 711
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review granted, (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000) (citing Balsamides, 734
A.2d at 738).
94. See id.
95. 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
96. Id. at 507.
2000] 1217
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funds to make ... investments in Stratosphere Corporation, (2)
misappropriating and misusing material, nonpublic corporate
information to profit personally through insider trading, and (3)
exposing Grand to liability for violations of... securities laws." 97 In
response to the suit, Grand appointed a special litigation
committee. 9 The committee, after reviewing numerous documents
but offering no analysis, recommended none of the claims be
pursued. 99 Based on the committee's recommendation, the district
court dismissed the suit.10
On appeal, the court noted that this was not an issue of first
impression, and that their review was strictly limited to whether the
"committee was independent and conducted its investigation in
good faith." 10 The court rejected the contention that the brevity of
a special litigation committee report is indicative of an investigation• - 102
that was not conducted in good faith. As for the investigation,
the court noted that when an investigation was conducted by
competent members, and where the investigation was procedurally
adequate, generally the investigation was conducted in good
faith. 1
03
E. No Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Violate a Strict Confidentiality
Agreement Leading to Failure of Proposed Public Offering and
Subsequent Liquidation
In another derivative suit, St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet
104Recycling Assocs., the court declined to extend a corporate
director's duty of care to encompass compliance with a
confidentiality agreement surrounding a proposed buyout of a
corporation in order to protect the company's creditors. The suit
began when Pallet Recycling Association of North America, Inc.
(PRANA) was offered $10 million for the sale of the entire106
company. The purchase agreement was conditioned upon
97. Id. at 505.
98. See id. at 506.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 507.
102. See id. at 509-10.
103. Seeid. at 510.
104. 589 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
105. Seeid. at 515.
106. See id at 514.
1218 [Vol. 26:4
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PRANA's keeping the terms of the sale confidential. Despite the
agreement, the terms of sale became public, resulting in the sale
falling through, and PRANA's liquidation of ten to twenty percent
of the original sale price.1g8
The court noted that Minnesota had never extended a
corporate director's duty of care to include completing a sale or
pubic offering so as to protect the creditors of that particular109
company. To do so, the court noted, would defy the business
judgment rule and instead interject a corporation's creditors' into




109. Seeid. at 515.
110. Seeid. at 516.
12192000]
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